The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology: Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-Determination by Jansen, Yakaré-Oulé
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology:
Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-
Determination
Yakaré-Oulé Jansen
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jansen, Yakaré-Oulé (2007) "The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology: Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-
Determination," Akron Law Review: Vol. 40 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss2/3
JANSENFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007 12:51:26 PM 
 
311 
THE RIGHT TO FREELY HAVE SEX?  
 BEYOND BIOLOGY: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
 AND SEXUAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
Yakaré-Oulé Jansen∗ 
 INTRODUCTION 
Sex is a difficult subject for us. It is an inevitable part of our lives 
and identities, no matter how we choose to deal with it; either by living a 
life of celibacy or by means of an open manifestation of our sexuality.  
Yet, like that other notorious constant factor in life, death, we find it 
very difficult to discuss anything having to do with it.  Some of the 
greatest minds in history have struggled with the subject,1 and the great 
 
∗ LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 2006; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.) 
Dutch Civil Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005; Meester in de Rechten 
(J.D./LL.B. equiv.) International & European Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 
2005. 
 1. Although sometimes contradictory in his statements on love and sex, Plato generally 
considered sex to be of secondary importance. In his ode to love, The Symposium, he emphasizes 
that virtuous love between men should not be about sex, but about improvement and education of 
the soul.  PLATO, The Symposium, in PLATO’S EROTIC DIALOGUES 15, 21-25 (William S. Cobb 
trans., State University of New York Press 1993) (1800).  In The Republic, he in fact argues for free 
sex, but only as a means to satisfy what he considers more of an animal appetite that sometimes 
cannot be suppressed and which has the sole aim of breeding children.  PLATO, PLATO’S REPUBLIC 
117 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1974).  Descartes considered the mind to be 
separate from the mechanical body, considering man a spirit who makes use of a body.  RENÉ 
DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDIATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 3 (David 
Weissman ed., Yale University Press 1996).  Schopenhauer acknowledged that sex permeates 
everything in our lives, but he never hid his disdain for matters related to love, which he considered 
an illusion, a trick of nature to facilitate sex between partners that make a good genetic match. 
 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, Metaphysics of Love, in ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER, available at http:/ 
/etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/essays/chapter12.html (originally published in 
the second edition of DIE WELT ALS WILLE UND VORSTELLUNG [THE WORLD AS WILL AND 
REPRESENTATION] in 1844).  But the most prominent name that springs to mind when talking about 
sex is Freud, who allegedly said that "the only unnatural sexual behavior is none at all" and 
published his DREI ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR SEXUAL THEORIA in 1905 (SIGMUND FREUD, THREE 
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey trans., The Alcuin Press 1949)). 
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taboo on nudity and sex in American media2 shows that even societies 
which boast an enormous sex industry3 sometimes still do not quite 
know how to deal with sex in day-to-day life. Yet, sex is at the basis of 
our very existence, not only for the biological aspect of procreation, but 
also because of its connection to our deepest sense of self.  Sex is one of 
the most private aspects of who we are. 
How does the law deal with sex? How is sex part of the human 
rights body?  What rights related to sex exist and, more specifically, 
what is the position of women in all of this?4 
At the International Conference on Population and Development 
held in Cairo in 1994, the following definition of reproductive health 
was endorsed by 165 nations: 
Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all 
matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and 
processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able 
to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability 
to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do 
so. Implicit in this last condition is the right of men and women to be 
informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and 
acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other 
methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against 
the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that 
will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and 
provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant. 
 
 2. A recent example is the storm caused by the event referred to in the media as ‘nipplegate’ 
when during a performance on MTV’s Superbowl Football Show, singer Justin Timberlake exposed 
the breast of Janet Jackson. The broadcasting network CBS was subsequently flooded with 
complaints of families, stating that “the family tradition had been interrupted by unexpected nudity” 
and received a fine of $550,000 USD.  Julie Hilden, Jackson ‘Nipplegate’ illustrates danger of 
chilling free speech, CNN, (Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/20/ 
findlaw.analysis.hilden.jackson/index.html. 
 3. The US porn industry has been estimated to generate between $10 billion and $12 billion 
USD in annual profits. A great number of Fortune 500 companies, like AT&T and Time Warner, 
collect a significant portion of that sum. See James Harder, Porn 500 – blue chip connections to 
porn industry – Statistical Data Included, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m1571/is_2_17/ai_72273779; Timothy Egan, Wall Street Meets Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
23, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/technology/ 
23PORN.html?ex=1145246400&en=c98aee53f024bce0&ei=5070. 
 4. A number of issues raised in this article can be applied to matters of sexual orientation, 
and on occasion the topic will come up to support an argument made for women’s rights. The focus, 
however, will primarily be on women because it would be impossible to do justice to the sexual 
orientation perspective within the confines of this brief article. 
2
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[emphasis added]5 
The Cairo Programme’s definition of reproductive health was 
affirmed and elaborated a year later by the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action: 
The human rights of women include their right to have control over 
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, 
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, 
discrimination and violence. Equal relationships between women and 
men in matters of reproduction, including full respect for the integrity 
of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility 
for sexual behaviour and its consequences. [emphasis added]6 
The aim of this article is to explore the extent to which women’s 
reproductive rights embrace the concept of sexual self-determination,7 
i.e., the right of women to enjoy their sexuality on an equal basis with 
men, free from any form of coercion or pressure and with the freedom to 
decide if and when to reproduce. My thesis is that so far the focus has 
primarily been on reproductive health and that women’s equality in the 
sexual arena warrants more attention as it is both interconnected with a 
number of fundamental human rights and an important aspect of the 
general concept of self-determination, which women should be able to 
pursue on a par with men. 
Part I will briefly set out how sexual rights are approached in the 
national legal arena. The way the U.S. Supreme Court treats 
reproductive rights provides a good example as it has some analogies 
with the treatment of reproductive rights under international human 
rights law;8 the Court focuses primarily on the biological aspects of 
sexuality and has been reluctant to acknowledge rights that fall within 
the realm of sexual self-determination.9 This case study is followed in 
 
 5. Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, 
Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, ch. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter 
ICPD Programme of Action]. 
 6. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 
Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, ch. IV, § C, para. 96, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1996) 
[hereinafter Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action]. 
 7. As this survey pertains to the freedom to make independent decisions about one’s sex life 
on the basis of international human rights norms, I prefer to use the term “sexual self-
determination” to distinguish it from the terms used for this concept within national law, such as 
“sexual sovereignty” and “sexual citizenship,” in particular because of the link it suggests between 
sexuality and self-realization. The term “sexual rights” has a more general scope but is used 
interchangeably with “reproductive rights” on occasion. 
 8. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. 
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Part II by an analysis of to what extent the treaty bodies of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) consider women’s 
sexuality in connection with the reproductive rights found in the 
respective treaties and to what degree these comments extend beyond the 
realm of reproductive health. I will then proceed with an evaluation of 
the need for a more extensive interpretation or an adjusted definition of 
reproductive rights in Part III. 
PART I: LAW AND SEXUALITY 
When it comes to sex, women are primarily the ones to find that 
their bodies are highly regulated by the law. Laws on abortion, 
contraception, and maternal conduct during pregnancy as well as welfare 
regulations intended to deter women from having children10 hardly affect 
men. In addition, there are a number of persistent stereotypes to 
complicate matters, both on a personal level and in the legal arena, 
where equality according to the letter of the law does not always apply 
in practice due to its application by judges or juries.11 This treatment of 
women and their sexuality fits within a historical pattern, in which a 
woman’s sexuality was not hers to make decisions on; across cultures, 
her sexuality belonged to her family, tribe, or lineage and not to 
herself.12 Securing a good marriage had financial consequences for a 
 
 10. For an extensive overview of the problems women encounter when it comes to these 
matters, see JUDITH GREENBERG, MARTHA MINOW & DOROTHY ROBERTS, MARY JOE FRUG’S 
WOMEN AND THE LAW 649-776 (3d ed. 2004). 
      11.   Consider the way a woman’s behavior as a wife and mother is evaluated as opposed to the 
behavior of the father when pursuing a career at the same time as raising a family and how this 
reflects on custody decisions. D. Kelly Weisberg points out a number of gender stereotypes, 
including the performance of certain symbolic child care tasks a mother “should” perform, and the 
consideration that a woman’s dedication to her career is a sign of unfitness as a parent, which stands 
in stark contrast of the man’s idealized image as a “good provider” when he spends a significant 
amount of time on work instead of his family.  D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the 
Professionalization of Motherhood: Marcia Clark's Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 295, 
313-38 (1995).   On equal opportunities in the workplace and its distortion due to fixed ideas about 
gender, see generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial 
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest 
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). On the impact of race and gender on rape law, see 
generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Identity Politics, Intersectionality and 
Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). On unconscious bias and equal 
employment opportunity legislation, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). 
 12. Oliver Phillips, A Brief Introduction to the Relationship Between Sexuality and Rights, 33 
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woman’s family or tribe, and in order for a good marriage to be secured, 
a woman (or girl) had to be chaste before anything else.13 Forced 
marriages and dowers may not be the order of the day in this 
hemisphere,14 but it can be argued that women’s sovereignty over their 
bodies continues to be severely curtailed until this day, be it by different 
means. 
There are no sexual rights mentioned in the Constitution. The right 
to use contraception and the right to have an abortion, however, have 
been brought under the heading of privacy by the Supreme Court.15 The 
connection between privacy and sex seems to be quite a natural 
combination; Abramson refers to them as “natural bedfellows.”16 
Probably most of us would answer ‘no’ when asked whether we would 
like the State in our bedrooms, the place where we commit our most 
private acts. Yet, the Supreme Court’s notion of privacy all but allows us 
to do whatever we please in private, drawing the line when it no longer 
comes to reproductive sex.17 
The Griswold case18 recognized the right to make decisions on 
 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 464 (2005). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Obtaining statistics on the prevalence of forced marriages in the United States and Europe 
has proven to be difficult. In a 2005 publication on legislation on forced marriages in Council of 
Europe countries, the Council concluded that none of the surveyed countries had carried out any 
thorough quantitative research on the matter.  Edwige Rude-Antoine, Forced marriages in Council 
of Europe member states: A Comparative Study of 
Legislation and Political Initiatives, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 (2005), available at http:// 
www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Equality/PDF_CDEG%282005%291_E.pdf.  Generally, countries 
make a connection between the prevalence of forced marriages and migration flows, an example of 
which is the Norwegian Human Rights Service’s publication on the position of Muslim women in 
Norway, HEGE STORHAUG & HUMAN RIGHTS SERVICE, FEMININ INTEGRERING - UTFORDRINGER I 
ET FLERETNISK SAMFUNN [HUMAN VISAS: A REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES OF EUROPE’S 
INTEGRATION CRISIS] (2003). 
 15. Vehemently opposing the public/private distinction is Catharine MacKinnon, who argues 
that privacy is a false notion for women, as the private sphere is constructed to perpetuate abuse 
against women.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168-69 
(1989). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW (Harvard University Press 1987).  Denominating certain matters as strictly private arguably 
takes away the responsibility of government to undertake action as well as for human rights groups 
to intervene.  See Dina Bogecho, Putting it to Good Use: The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Women’s Right to Reproductive Health, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
229 (2004). 
 16. PAUL R. ABRAMSON, STEVEN D. PINKERTON & MARK HUPPIN, SEXUAL RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 45 (NYU PRESS 2003). 
 17. See, e.g,. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 153-54 (1973); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 18. Griswold,, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
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contraception under the denominator of privacy, as did Roe v. Wade19 for 
the right to have an abortion. Yet as soon as the link with reproduction is 
missing, the privacy argument appears to lose its persuasiveness for the 
Court. In Bowers v. Hardwick,20 the Supreme Court concluded that 
privacy did not extend to homosexual relationships, upholding a Georgia 
statute against sodomy. In the more recent Lawrence v. Texas,21 the 
Court tackles the problem of same-sex sexual relations from a different 
angle: liberty.22 The decision has been celebrated as heralding the next 
step in the struggle for gay and lesbian equality, but when one reads the 
judgment closely, the Court has not been as generous at it may seem. 
Strictly speaking, the sex in this case could never actually be 
reproductive, but the way the Court interprets the type of relationship 
between the two men does evoke all the traditional connotations that 
come up with the idea of reproductive sex.23 As Katherine Franke argues 
in her critical reading of Lawrence,24 the Court – in spite of its 
qualification of sodomy laws as “demeaning the lives of homosexual 
persons”25 – stresses in several ways that the relationship between 
Lawrence and his partner resembles that of a married couple and that the 
sex constitutes but an element in a more enduring bond.26 “More 
enduring than what?” Franke rightly asks, “Than sex?”27 
Franke observes that Lawrence acknowledges sex only as 
instrumental to the formation of intimate relationships and not as 
something that has a social or legal status in its own right.28 Obviously, 
the Court did not take to heart the dissent written by Justice Blackmun in 
the Bowers case: 
 
 19. Roe,, 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
 20. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
 21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 22. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court is willing to approach the issue of 
abortion from the same angle. Several European Constitutional Courts have taken this stance, 
declaring that liberal abortion laws are consistent with women’s right to liberty. See, e.g. 
Juristenvereniging Pro Vita/ De Staat der Nederlanden, Hoge Raad, The Hague, February 8, 1990, 
NJ 413, 707 (English summary in 19(5) EUR. LAW. D. 179-180 (1991)) 
 23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 24. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1399, 1408 (2004). 
 25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Franke, supra note 24, at 1408. 
 28. Id. at 1417. Lisa Rabie argues that the Court in Lawrence does hint at the principles 
constituting full sexual citizenship (sexual equality, sexual dignity, and sexual privacy), but stops 
short of formulating any robust notion of sexual citizenship and instead creates a very narrow liberty 
right.  Lisa Limor Rabie, Can You Put on Your Red Light?: Lawrence’s Sexual Citizenship Rights in 
Terms of International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 616 (2005). 
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Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual 
intimacy is “a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to 
family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality” . . . .  The fact that individuals define themselves in a 
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others 
suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many ‘right’ 
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness 
of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to 
choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. . . .  The 
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court 
really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all 
individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations 
with others.29 
Blackmun is right, and – as Franke points out – the Supreme Court 
got it wrong again in Lawrence. Abramson argues: “Sexual choices 
reflect individual rights, not rights that emerge only in relationships; 
these rights are not limited to dyads, whether heterosexual or 
homosexual, or to particular types of relationships (e.g., marriage).”30 
But without explicit wording in the law, and a Court that is not willing to 
give much freedom to individuals to determine what they want to do 
with their bodies together with other consenting adults, there appears not 
to be much room for independent sexual rights outside the sphere of 
marriage or marriage-like relationships. 
 
PART II: SEXUAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  Sexual rights as human rights 
Not all rights are enumerated. This goes for both national 
legislation (see, for example, the body of rights that has been read into 
the Constitution) and the international human rights treaty regimes with 
their subsequent comments, explanations, and interpretations by both 
treaty monitoring bodies and courts. The premise that sexual expression 
or self-determination is a natural right seems viable,31 applicable to each 
and every one of us, as it goes to the very heart of our existence, whether 
you would like to place it under the Constitutional denominator of the 
 
 29. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205-06. 
 30. ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 16. 
 31. Id. at 74-77. 
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‘pursuit of happiness,’32 the right to be able to determine the way one 
leads one’s life in a way one sees fit, or under any of the rights embodied 
in the current human rights treaty regime pertaining to some form of 
self-determination. Naturally, there are limitations that should be 
considered as on the exercise of almost any of the other rights and 
freedoms.  Enjoyment of one’s rights should not encroach upon another 
person’s rights and freedoms, which means that certain forms of sexual 
expression – such as sex involving partners who did not consent or are 
not in a position to reasonably do so – may be legitimately regulated.33 
The Center for Reproductive Rights (“CRR”), in its publication 
‘Reproductive Rights are Human Rights,’34 voices the idea that all 
persons have reproductive rights, founded upon principles of human 
dignity and equality.35 These reproductive and sexual rights can be 
divided into a number of principles that fall into two categories: the right 
to reproductive health care and the right to reproductive self-
determination. According to the CRR, they are “grounded in some of the 
oldest recognized human rights.”36 The Cairo Programme of Action 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Examples mentioned by Fried and Landsberg-Lewis are rape and incest.  Susana T. Fried 
& Ilana Landsberg-Lewis, Sexual Rights: From Concept to Strategy, in WOMEN AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, Vol. 3, 92 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., Transnational 
Publishers 2001).  A difficulty is that some would argue that same-sex relations offend a public 
sense of morality and therefore fall within the permissible area of control under the law. Arguably, a 
moral offense is not the same as a mental or physical harm, but it is certainly difficult to draw the 
line by either standard as there are always situations that do not conform to the rule. One could think 
of S/M sex between consenting adults, which strictly speaking can involve physical harm but on a 
voluntary basis, or marital rape, which involves both non-consent and mental or physical harm, but 
often is not proscribed by law. 
 34. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS (4th 
ed. 2003), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_bo_rrhr.html. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The Center for Reproductive Rights and Policy and University of Toronto International 
Programme on Reproductive and Sexual Health Law, Bringing Rights to Bear: An Analysis of the 
Work of UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive and Sexual Rights, 17 (2002). For the 
subject of sexual self-determination, a number of the ‘Ten Human Rights Keys to Reproductive 
Rights’ are relevant: the right to life, liberty, and security, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6(1), 9(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; the right to health, reproductive health, and family planning, 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 
10(2), 12(1), & 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 10(h), 
12(1), 12(2) & 14(2), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]); the right to decide 
the number and spacing of children, CEDAW, supra, at art. 16(1); the right to privacy, ICCPR, 
supra, at art. 17(1), 17(2); the right to be free from discrimination on specified grounds, UDHR, 
supra, at art. 2, ICESCR, supra, at art. 2(2), ICCPR, supra, at art. 2(1), CEDAW, supra, at art. 1(3), 
& 11(2); and the right to be free from sexual violence, CEDAW, supra, at art. 5(a), 6, CENTER FOR 
8
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affirms that reproductive rights are already embedded within the current 
international framework: 
[R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already 
recognized in national laws, international laws and international human 
rights documents and other consensus documents. These rights rest on 
the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to 
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their 
children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right 
to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also 
includes the right to make decisions regarding reproduction free of 
discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights 
documents.37 
Incorporated in this right is the ability to “have a satisfying and safe 
sex life” and the capability “to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, 
when and how often to do so.”38 
In spite of this broad phrasing, the Cairo Programme of Action as a 
whole (as well as the Beijing Declaration one year later39) places great 
emphasis on sex as a biological function. The greatest concerns appear 
to be family planning and the good health of mothers and children. The 
second focal point is freedom from violence or coercion. The linkage of 
reproductive health and protection from sexual harm with human rights 
may have reached a broad audience, but it is questionable whether it 
does the overall case for women’s equality much good. As Alice Miller 
argues, a focus on women reduced to “suffering bodies in need of 
protection by the law and by the State” can frustrate more fundamental 
goals, such as women’s need for participation and equality.40 Franke 
asserts that women’s rights to enjoy their own bodies is generally absent 
from feminist legal theory, the debate being focused on framing female 
sexuality as a question of dependency or danger rather than a source of 
pleasure.41 Moreover, she asks why the fact that most women will be 
 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 34 at 41). 
 37. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 5, at ch. 7. The Beijing Platform affirms what is 
said in the Cairo Declaration, by stating that “reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that 
are already recognized in national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus 
documents.”  Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, supra note 6, at para. 95. 
 38. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 5, at ch. 7. 
 39. Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, supra note 6. 
 40. Alice Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women and Human Rights: Women make 
Demands and Ladies get Protection, Health & Human Rights: An International Journal 16, 25 
(2004). 
 41. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 199 (2001). 
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reproductive is so readily accepted.42 Sex beyond reproduction – just for 
pleasure, between same-sex partners or for economic motives – takes the 
back seat here, just as it does for the Supreme Court. Focusing on the 
reproductive aspect of sexual rights keeps the discussion safely in the 
biological realm. As Philips argues:  
By marginalizing that sex which is not reproductive, this approach . . . 
presents a key method of building a broad-based consensus. But it 
simultaneously fails to address the rights of those whose sexual 
behavior does not fit within a reproductive paradigm, who do not fit 
the chaste model of the innocent victim, and who are often most 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and discrimination.43 
B. The doctrine of reproductive self-determination and its interpretation 
by the treaty monitoring bodies 
1.  The treaty monitoring bodies 
The three major human rights treaties under discussion here each 
have a committee44 mandated to monitor the States Parties’ compliance 
 
 42. Id. at 183-97. 
 43. Phillips, supra note 12, at 461-62. For a critical evaluation of the progress made after the 
Cairo Conference, see Sumati Nair, Preeti Kirbat and Sarah Sexton, A Decade After Cairo, 
Women’s Health in a Free Market Economy, THE CORNER HOUSE, Summer 2004, available at 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=62140.  The authors argue that the Cairo 
Programme in fact endorsed a neo-liberal framework for reproductive health policy, in recent years 
most visibly executed in the context of international trade agreements. This is the result of women’s 
organizations placing too much emphasis on reaching a common ground with population 
organizations, donor groups, and governments, resulting in an actual deterioration of women’s 
access to reproductive health services in a great number of countries.  Id. at 9-10. 
 44. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is 
established under article 17 of the treaty: 
(1) For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation 
of the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the 
Committee) consisting, at the time of entry into force of the Convention, of 
eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Convention by the thirty-
fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and 
competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be 
elected by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their 
personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical 
distribution and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as 
well as the principal legal systems. (2) The members of the Committee shall 
be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. 
Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. 
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 17.  The ICCPR provides for the establishment of the Human Rights 
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with the treaty obligations by examining periodical country reports.45 
When a country report has been submitted, the independent human 
rights experts of the treaty body meet with representatives of the country 
under review, NGOs and UN agencies, after which consultations the 
committee sends its concluding observations to the reporting 
government.46 Although the concluding observations are not legally 
binding, they can provide guidelines on the interpretation of treaty 
provisions in the same way that jurisprudence can clarify national 
legislation. Much depends, though, on the clarity of the country report 
and the data provided therein.47 
In addition, the committees can issue general comments and general 
recommendations48 as they see fit. These comments and 
recommendations are intended to give guidelines to States Parties on 
how to interpret the often broadly formulated human rights provisions 
and thus help governments with their proper implementation. As the 
committees are not judicial bodies and therefore cannot issue binding 
decisions,49 the recommendations are, at most, an authoritative 
 
Committee (“HRC”) in article 28:  
(1) There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the 
present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry 
out the functions hereinafter provided. (2) The Committee shall be composed of 
nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be persons of high 
moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration 
being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal 
experience. (3) The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their 
personal capacity. 
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 28. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“CESCR”) was established by the Economic and Social Council instead of under the ICESCR.  
Economic and Social Council, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
ESC Res. 1985/17, U.N. Doc. No. E/1985/85. 
 45. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies 
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/leafletontreatybodies.pdf. 
 46. A yearly report of all concluding observations is sent to the UN General Assembly.  An 
NGO is a non-governmental organization. See http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/index.asp. 
 47. In addition to relevant and sufficiently detailed data information, it is important that the 
obligations, as well as the required performance standards, of States Parties with respect to the right 
under review are clear.  See Audrey Chapman, The Right to Health: Monitoring Women’s Right to 
Health Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1157, 1158-59 (1995). 
 48. CEDAW refers to its general comments as “general recommendations.” 
 49. Both the ICCPR and CEDAW have an Optional Protocol under which individuals (and, in 
the case of CEDAW, individuals and groups) can bring complaints. The decisions of the committees 
are not enforceable, but by signing the Optional Protocol, States Parties have agreed to be bound to 
the judgments on the cases brought.  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).  See also Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, 
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 10, 1999). 
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interpretation of the rights embodied in the treaties. They also influence 
the concluding observations.  By providing a clearer standard of 
compliance for States Parties, the concluding observations can be more 
specific as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not, which in turn 
contributes to the development of clearer standards by which to judge 
the States Parties. 
2.  The doctrine of sexual self-determination 
When looking at the treaty monitoring bodies’ consideration of 
sexual rights, one notices an interesting dichotomy. As relatively 
progressive as the committees are when considering matters related to 
family planning – condemning legislation criminalizing abortion and 
advocating the availability of safe measures of birth control – they are 
just as wary of the treatment of sex outside of the context of family and 
family planning. Nothing that comes close to a right to enjoy one’s 
sexuality is formulated, nor are any particular strong statements made 
with respect to same-sex relationships. The failure of the treaties to deal 
outright with an important dimension of sexual self-determination – the 
freedom from coercion – is partly remedied by the committees by 
prohibiting forced marriages and repeatedly condemning domestic 
violence, including marital rape.50 The HRC and CEDAW are the most 
outspoken on all aspects; the CESCR approaches sex as more of a 
biological issue and places great emphasis on reproductive health – its 
comments related to sexual rights are of a more indirect nature.51 
The following section provides a brief survey of the interpretation 
of reproductive rights by the treaty bodies. An intentional omission here 
is a discussion of the sex worker and trafficking, which is relevant but 
merits a more elaborate discussion than can be rendered within this 
context. It is nevertheless briefly mentioned with regard to CEDAW as 
this is the only treaty with a specific provision on the subject. This 
provision is also taken as proscribing violence against women in general. 
The autonomy to decide if and when to reproduce 
The right to freedom in reproductive decision-making is based upon 
broader principles of bodily autonomy and the right to physical 
integrity.52 Reference to these concepts is usually made in the context of 
 
 50. See, e.g,. ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 23(3); UDHR, supra note 36, at art. 16(2); 
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 16(1)(a)(b) (regarding forced marriage). 
 51. See generally ICESCR, supra note 36. 
 52. Bringing Rights to Bear, supra note 36, at 16. 
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a right to privacy or the right to liberty and security of the person. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in article 12 that “No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [or] family 
. . . . Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”53 Relevant rights in the ICCPR are – with a little 
stretch54 – article 6 on the right to life,55 article 9 on the right to liberty 
and security of person,56 and article 17 on the right to privacy, which 
makes a specific reference to privacy in relation to family life.57 
The most specific article on family planning is article 16 
CEDAW.58 In short, States Parties take it upon themselves to ensure that 
men and women have equal access to information regarding health care 
services related to family planning, as well as the possibility to make 
contraceptive choices. This forms an important part of what has been 
defined as sexual self-determination in the introduction: a woman’s right 
to decide freely if and when to reproduce. It should be borne in mind 
here though, that this only applies in so far as the right is given extensive 
interpretation. If there are any restrictions on the enjoyment of this right, 
such as the requirement of a connection to the concept of family, it 
would go against the idea of self-determination as it limits the enjoyment 
of sex for the sake of sex. 
According to General Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage 
and Family Relations,59 no reservations can be made to this article, as 
 
 53. UDHR, supra note 36, at art. 12. 
 54. In practice, the Human Rights Committee does not interpret articles 6 and 9 very broadly 
for the sake of reproductive rights.  ICCPR, supra note 36. 
 55. Article 6(1): “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”  Id. at art. 6(1). 
 56. Article 9(1): “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . . . .”  Id. at art. 
9(1). 
 57. Article 17: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. (2) 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”  Id. at art. 
17. 
 58. It states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: . . . (e) The same rights to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights. . . .   
CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 16(1)(e). Another important article is article 10(h), which stresses 
the equal right of women to have access to information and education in order to help ensure “the 
health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.”  Id. at art. 
10(h).  Access to health care services, including “those related to family planning” should be 
ensured by States Parties on the basis of article 12(1).  Id. at art. 12(1). 
 59. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family 
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that would be inconsistent with the principles of CEDAW. Yet, as 
practice has shown, this article is a favorite amongst States Parties when 
it comes to reservations and declarations of interpretation.60 CEDAW 
also makes the connection to women’s rights in marriage in General 
Recommendation 24,61 which qualifies the right of married women to 
freely decide the number and spacing of children as fundamental. 
The Human Rights Committee connects women’s reproductive 
rights with their right to privacy under article 17 ICCPR in General 
Comment 28,62 yet in its concluding observations noted concern that 
limited access for women to reproductive health services is a violation of 
women’s right to equality63 and their right to life.64 The Committee’s 
position on abortion laws is particularly outspoken: due to the relation 
between maternal mortality and abortion, it considers legislation 
criminalizing abortion as a violation of the right to life.65  CEDAW has 
 
Relations (13th Sess., 1994), U.N Doc. A/49/38  in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 222, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004), at 
261 [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 21]. 
 60. It has been said that CEDAW “has attracted the greatest number of substantive 
reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty,” 
Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women, 85 A.J.I.L. 281, 317 (1991). For a survey of the wide practice of making 
reservations to CEDAW, see Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643 (1989-1990). 
 61. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation 24: Women and Health (20th Sess., 1999), 
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, ch. I, in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 281, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) 
[hereinafter General Recommendation No. 24]. 
 62. U.N. HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, art. 3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add.10 (68th Sess., 2000), in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 181, para. 20, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN 
/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 28]. 
 63. See U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of 
the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Peru, para. 20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/70/PER (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Peru HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the 
Human Rights Committee: Poland, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.110 (July 29, 1999) 
[hereinafter Poland HRC]. 
 64. See U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of 
the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Chile, para. 15, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (Mar. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Chile HRC]; Peru HRC, supra note 63; 
Poland HRC, supra note 63. 
 65. In the case of Ecuador, the Committee went as far as connecting a high suicide rate among 
young girls with the restrictive access to abortion and considering that as a violation of the young 
women’s right to life. U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Ecuador, 
para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.92 (Aug. 18, 1998). See also U.N. HRC, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by 
the Human Rights Committee: Republic of Guatemala, para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM 
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taken a similar approach, urging States Parties to legalize abortion with 
the view of reducing abortion-related deaths.66  Especially in the case of 
rape, safe abortion should be easily accessible.67 Increased availability of 
 
(Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Guatemala HRC]; Chile HRC, supra note 64; U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Costa Rica, para. 11, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.107 (Apr. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Costa Rica HRC]; Poland HRC, supra note 63.  
Other than that, the Committee has requested the abolishment of restrictive abortion laws, see U.N. 
HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Argentina, para. 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/70/ARG (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina HRC]; Ecuador, supra; Guatemala HRC, 
supra; Peru HRC, supra note 63; Poland HRC, supra note 63.; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the 
Human Rights Committee: Senegal, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 82 (Nov. 19, 1997) 
[hereinafter Senegal HRC], as well as any other barriers barring the access to health information.  
See(Guatemala HRC, supra; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: 
Mongolia, para. 8(b), U.N. Doc . CCPR/C/79/Add.120 (Apr. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Mongolia 
HRC]; Poland HRC, supra note 63.  Family planning counseling, see, e.g., Argentina HRC, supra, 
sex education, see Poland HRC, supra note 63, safe contraceptives,  see Argentina HRC, supra; 
U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Colombia, para. 37, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (May 5, 1997) [hereinafter Columbia HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by 
the Human Rights Committee : Georgia, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (May 5, 1997), 
and safe abortion services, Argentina HRC, supra; Guatemala HRC, supra, should be available on 
an equal basis, and the requirement that health personnel report on women undergoing abortion is 
considered unacceptable.  See Chile HRC, supra note 64; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the 
Human Rights Committee: Venezuela, para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/VEN (Apr. 26, 2001) 
[hereinafter Venezuela HRC]. 
 66. See U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Colombia, para. 393-94, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 4, 1999) 
[hereinafter Columbia CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Dominican Republic, para. 349, U.N. Doc. A/53/38, 
(May, 14, 1998); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Namibia, Part II , para. 127, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 
1997) [hereinafter Namibia CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Nepal, para. 147-148, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/38/Rev.1 (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter Nepal CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Paraguay, 
para. 131, U.N. Doc. A/51/38 (May 9, 1996); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Peru, para. 340, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 8, 1998). 
 67. See U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Jordan, para. 180, U.N. Doc. A/55/38, (Jan. 27, 2000); U.N. 
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Panama, para. 201, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Panama 
CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Venezuela, para. 236, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1997) 
[hereinafter Venezuela CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
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contraceptives68 and other measures preventing abortion to be used as a 
means of birth control69 are recommended. One cannot help but notice 
that both committees do not call for an unequivocal right to have an 
abortion; the committees state that it should not be criminalized by law, 
but the underlying argument (or justification) appears to be mainly 
health-based, namely the prevention of maternal mortality. CEDAW’s 
exception to that line of reasoning with respect to rape is a significant 
but narrow one. 
Sliding down the spectrum towards an exclusively health-risk-
focused approach, we find the CESCR, which in General Comment 1470 
focuses primarily on the reduction of maternal mortality rates. The need 
for better information on contraceptives has been addressed in relation to 
teenage pregnancies71 and, according to the Committee, information 
programs should be used together with family planning policies as a 
means of reducing the use of abortion as a method for family planning.72 
 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Uruguay, para. 196, U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (Part I), 
(May 5, 2002). 
 68. U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Burundi, para. 62, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter 
Burundi CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women: Cameroon, para. 60, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (June 26, 2000) 
[hereinafter Cameroon CEDAW]; Colombia CEDAW, supra note 66, at para. 396; U.N. CEDAW, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 228, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (Feb. 1, 2000); U.N. CEDAW, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Nicaragua, para. 303, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Nicaragua CEDAW]; 
Venezuela CEDAW, supra note 67, at para. 243. 
 69. Burundi CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 62; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Kyrgyzstan, para. 136, U.N. 
Doc. A/54/38 (Jan. 27, 1999); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Romania, para. 315, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (June 23, 
2000); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Uzbekistan, paras. 185-186, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001); 
U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Vietnam, para. 266, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Vietnam 
CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Estonia, para. 111, U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (Part I) (May 7, 2002). 
 70. U.N. CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health, art. 12, U.N. E/C.12/2000/4 (22nd Sess., 2000), in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 92, para. 21, U.N. Doc. HRI 
/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. 
 71. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Cameroon, para. 45, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.40 (Dec, 8, 1999) [hereinafter 
Cameroon CESCR]. 
 72. See, e.g., U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, 
16
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Yet, the CESCR is more reticent than the HRC and CEDAW, having 
requested the liberalization of abortion laws on merely one occasion,73 in 
spite of its concern about the correlation between maternal mortality and 
abortions carried out outside the health profession.74 
The ability to enjoy one’s sexuality free from coercion or 
pressure 
This category could be rooted in a number of the rights mentioned 
under the previous heading as well, in particular those referring to bodily 
integrity and autonomy. When it comes to a general reference to a right 
to be free from gender-based or sexual violence, CEDAW unfortunately 
falls short. There are two articles in the Convention that are considered 
to include the right to be free from sexual violence, article 5(a)75 and 
article 6.76 Article 5(a) prescribes the obligation of States Parties to 
eliminate “customary and all other practices which are based on the idea 
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.”77 Appropriate measures to 
suppress the trafficking of women and “exploitation of prostitution of 
women” should be taken according to article 6.78 Other international 
treaties79 and declarations80 have made more explicit reference to the 
prohibition of sexual violence against women, but within the context of 
the human rights documents under discussion here, much depends on the 
 
Social, and Cultural Rights: Poland, para. 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.26 (June 16, 1998); U.N. 
CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 
Senegal, para. 47, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 (Sept. 24, 2001); U.N. CESCR, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Ukraine, para. 31, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.65 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
 73. U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Nepal, para. 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Nepal 
CESCR]. 
 74. See Cameroon CESCR, supra note 71, at para. 25; U.N. CESCR, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Mexico, para. 29, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.41 (Dec. 8, 1999); Nepal CESCR, supra note 73, at para. 32. 
 75. CEDAW, supra note 36, at art. 5(a). 
 76. Id. at art. 6. 
 77. Id. at art. 5(a). 
 78. Id. at art. 6. 
 79. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534. 
 80. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. 
Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
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interpretation given to concepts such as liberty, security of person, and 
bodily integrity. 
Even though violence against women does not have its own 
provision in CEDAW, it is high on the Committee’s agenda, which is 
reflected by its concluding observations.81 The starting point for the 
Committee is that violence against women exists in all countries and that 
not presenting data on the subject calls for further inquiries by CEDAW 
in order to obtain those.82 Special attention is paid to the intersection 
with race and other social characteristics.83 The Committee has 
comprehensively condemned domestic violence,84 as well as sexual 
violence and sexual harassment in general. Domestic violence is 
explicitly taken to include marital rape, which governments are 
recommended to make punishable under criminal law.85  Making the link 
between sexual violence and reproductive rights, the Committee has 
declared that sexual abuse of girls by older men violates girls’ 
reproductive rights,86 and the Committee has condemned the prohibition 
of abortion extended to cases of rape.87 
The HRC’s General Comment 28 condemns domestic violence, 
 
 81. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Cameroon CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 65; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Germany, 
para. 306, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Germany CEDAW]; U.N. CEDAW, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Ireland, para. 188, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (July 1, 1999). 
 83. See, e.g., Germany CEDAW, supra note 82, at para. 318. 
 84. See Cameroon CEDAW, supra note 68, at para. 49–50; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Egypt, para. 
342, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Egypt CEDAW]; Germany CEDAW, supra 
note 82, at paras. 306, 308; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Italy, para. 359, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Re v.1, Part II 
(Aug. 12, 1997); U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Netherlands, para. 207, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001); U.N. 
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: New Zealand, para. 279, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (July 9, 1998); Venezuela CEDAW, 
supra note 67, at para. 233; Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69, at para. 258. 
 85. See, e.g., Egypt CEDAW, supra note 84, at para. 344; U.N. CEDAW, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Greece, para. 
192, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 2, 1999); Namibia CEDAW, supra note 66, at Part II, para. 120; U.N. 
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Thailand, para. 243, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (Feb. 2, 1999); Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69, 
paras. 258–59. 
 86. See Nicaragua CEDAW, supra note 68, at paras. 298–99. 
 87. See Colombia CEDAW, supra note 66, at para. 393; Nepal CEDAW, supra note 66, at 
para. 147; Panama CEDAW, supra note 67, at para. 201; Venezuela CEDAW, supra note 67, at 
para. 236. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss2/3
JANSENFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  12:51:26 PM 
2007] RIGHT TO FREELY HAVE SEX 329 
together with sexual violence against women88 as a violation of article 7 
ICCPR and the Committee’s Concluding Observations on domestic 
violence are numerous,89 reiterating that all domestic violence - 
including marital rape90 - should be criminalized.91 The CESCR 
considers domestic violence against women a health risk,92 as stated in 
 
 88. General Comment 28, supra note 62; Argentina HRC, supra note 65, at para. 15; U.N. 
HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Czech Republic, para. 23, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/72/CZE (Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Czech Republic HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations 
by the Human Rights Committee: India, para. 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997) 
[hereinafter India HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Japan, para. 
30, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Japan HRC]; U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, para. 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter Russian Federation HRC]; U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments 
of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America., para. 285, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.50, A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995); U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Uruguay., para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.90 (Apr. 8, 1998); Venezuela HRC, 
supra note 65, at paras. 17, 20, 26. 
 89. Some examples are Argentina HRC, supra note 65, at para. 15; Colombia HRC, supra 
note 65, at para. 27; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Guyana, para. 14, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.121 (Apr. 25, 2000); India HRC, supra note 88; Japan, supra note 88; 
U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, para. 17, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.32 (Apr. 18, 1994); Russian Federation HRC, supra note 88; Senegal HRC, supra 
note 65, at para. 13; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Uzbekistan, para. 
19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/UZB (Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Uzbekistan HRC]; U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Yemen, para. 255, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 51, 
A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Yemen HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Zimbabwe, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 89 (Apr. 6, 1998) [hereinafter 
Zimbabwe HRC]. 
 90. See India HRC, supra note 88; Mongolia HRC, supra note 65, at para. 8(g); Uzbekistan 
HRC, supra note 89; Zimbabwe HRC, supra note 89. 
 91. See Costa Rica HRC, supra note 65, at para. 12; Czech Republic HRC, supra note 88, at 
para. 14; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Guatemala, para. 33, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63 (Apr. 3, 1996); Japan HRC, supra note 88; U.N. HRC, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by 
the Human Rights Committee: The Kyrgyz Republic, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CPR/CO/69/KGZ (July 
24, 2000); Russian Federation HRC, supra note 88; Senegal HRC, supra note 65, at para. 13; 
Uzbekistan HRC, supra note 89; Yemen HRC, supra note 89. 
 92. Id. at para. 21. 
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General Comment 14.93 Legislation that does not proscribe marital rape 
has been criticized in a number of Concluding Observations.94 
CEDAW also defines forced marriage as a form of violence against 
women in General Recommendation 19.95 Applying this concept in its 
Concluding Observations, CEDAW has recommended that States 
criminalize the practice of forced marriage and also provide training for 
State officials to create a greater sensitivity to this and other types of 
violence against women.96 The Human Rights Committee follows this 
line of reasoning in General Comment 28 on the Equality of Rights 
between Men and Women,97 in which it underlines that women have a 
right to freely make an informed choice on whom they marry. However, 
the Committee has not fully integrated these statements in its 
Concluding Observations beyond a repeated expression of general 
concern.98  It has made some recommendations on eliminating the 
practice though, including education aiming to change social attitudes 
 
 93. General Comment No. 14, supra note 70, at 92. 
 94. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Egypt, para. 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44 (May 23, 2000); U.N. CESCR, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Mongolia, 
para. 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.47 (Sept. 1, 2000); U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Syrian Arab Republic, paras. 24, 40, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Syrian Arab Republic CESCR]. 
 95. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women (11th Sess., 
1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/38, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 247, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) [hereinafter General 
Recommendation No. 19]. 
 96. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Guinea, paras. 134-35, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001), and 
Vietnam CEDAW, supra note 69, at paras. 258–59. 
 97. General Comment No. 28, supra note 62, at 182. 
 98. See, e.g., India HRC, supra note 88; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Kuwait, para. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/69/KW T (July 27, 2000); U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Nigeria, para. 291, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65, 
A/52/40 (July 24, 1996) [hereinafter Nigeria HRC]; U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Peru, para. 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.72 (Nov. 18, 1996); U.N. HRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Sudan, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 
(Nov. 19, 1997); U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Syrian Arab Republic, 
para. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/SYR (Apr. 24, 2001); Venezuela HRC, supra note 65, at paras.  
18, 20; Zimbabwe HRC, supra note 89, at para. 12. 
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towards forced marriage99 and legal reform.100 The CESCR has spoken 
out against forced marriage in its Concluding Observations101 by urging 
countries to focus on the elimination of the practice as well as the 
customary beliefs that encourage it, but this viewpoint has not made its 
way into the Committee’s general comments yet. 
Sexual self-determination beyond freedom from coercion and 
unwanted pregnancy: women’s freedom to enjoy their 
sexuality on a par with men 
None of the committees make reference to reproductive rights 
beyond the principle of freedom from coercion and the right to make 
independent decisions on procreation, nor do they formulate a right of 
women to enjoy their sexuality on a par with men. The only references 
which can be interpreted as sex outside the realm of procreation are 
made with respect to sexual orientation and then often in connection 
with the family concept, except for the CESCR, which takes a stand only 
in relation with the access to health care102 and has just once asked a 
State to proscribe discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its 
Concluding Observations.103 
In its General Recommendation 21 on Equality in Marriage and 
Family Relations,104 CEDAW asserts that “family” can mean various 
things depending on a number of factors such as religion, custom, and 
tradition.105 The Human Rights Committee lays down a similar principle 
and says that whichever concept is accepted in a particular country, it 
should be given the protection against discrimination in the ICCPR’s 
implementation as guaranteed in article 2.106 This provides not much of a 
 
 99. See, e.g., India HRC, supra note 88; Nigeria HRC, supra note 98. 
 100. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: Monaco, para. 12, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/MCO (Aug. 28, 2001); Venezuela HRC, supra note 65, at paras. 18, 20. 
 101. See Cameroon CESCR, supra note 71, at paras. 14, 33; U.N. CESCR, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Kyrgyzstan, paras. 16, 
23, 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49 (Sept. 1, 2000); Syrian Arab Republic CESCR, supra note 94, 
at paras. 14, 31. 
 102. General Comment No. 14, supra note 70. 
 103. See U.N. CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: China-Hong Kong SPECIAL Administrative Region, para. 31, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.58 (May 21, 2001). 
 104. General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 59, at 261. 
 105. Id. at 256. 
 106. U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 18: Non–Discrimination (37th Sess., 1989), in 
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basis for a same-sex couple to obtain recognition as a family by 
appealing to the ICCPR, even though the Committee has condemned 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in its Concluding 
Observations.107 CEDAW has also spoken out against discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation in its Concluding Observations; it has – 
as the only treaty body so far – considered sexual orientation a valid 
ground for asylum,108 and it has expressed its concern about the 
criminalization of homosexuality.109 Yet, from a committee that has 
empowerment of women as a guiding principle and has agreed upon 
using the Cairo Programme as a guideline for developing performance 
standards in its general recommendations,110 one might expect a more 
progressive approach. Surely, it would be a difficult task to define which 
parameters could be used to measure government compliance, but that 
should not stop the Committee from formulating a standpoint that truly 
empowers women – explicitly establishing them as sexual beings 
beyond reproduction. 
PART III: EXTENSIVE INTERPRETATION OR REDEFINITION? 
An explicit right for women to enjoy their sexuality on equal terms 
is not formulated in any of the treaties.  On the basis of the formulation 
of the rights connected to reproductive self-determination, there appears 
to be a stronger basis for the component related to the freedom to decide 
whether to reproduce than for the freedom to enjoy one’s sexuality free 
from coercion. For the latter, the emphasis lies on freedom from 
violence, not on the aspect of enjoyment. How far this freedom extends 
depends on the interpretation of the rights enumerated and in particular 
whether any explicit or implicit connection to some sort of family life is 
required. 
 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, at 147, para. 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004). 
 107. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom 
and Northern Ireland-The Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, para. 14, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.119 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
 108. U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Sweden, para. 334, U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (July 31, 2001). 
 109. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Mexico, para. 420, U.N. Doc. A/53/38 (May 14, 1998). 
 110. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 22, Amending Article 20 of the Convention 
(14th Sess., 1995), U.N. Doc. A/50/38, in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 250, U.N Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 
(2003). 
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Looking at the recommendations and observations made by the 
treaty bodies, we can conclude that their strongest points are freedom 
from coercion and the freedom to make reproductive decisions. In both 
cases the HRC and CEDAW are the most outspoken; the CESCR tends 
to make less strong statements, and if it does, the comments have a 
qualifying connection with health issues.  Besides some relatively weak 
references in the context of the rights of same-sex couples under the 
treaty regimes, no reference can be found to matters related to sex 
beyond procreation, and even then the references are made in connection 
with the concept of family. 
One can only guess why the respective committees have not yet 
addressed this aspect of sexual rights. A possible motive could be that it 
is difficult for the committees’ members to reach consensus on the 
matter and that therefore the focus has remained on the more clear-cut 
subject of sex as biology. On the other hand, abortion and birth control 
are controversial subjects in their own right, and negotiations on 
declarations such as those made by the Cairo and Beijing conference 
have not lacked ample resistance from the Holy See and a great number 
of Catholic and Islamic countries.111 In addition, it is not necessarily true 
that reaching a broad consensus yields the best result for women’s 
reproductive rights. The Cairo Programme of Action was the result of 
extensive lobbying by women’s organizations, but it has been argued to 
have actually resulted in a setback instead of a step forward.112 
Another reason could be that the committees have not yet found a 
way to incorporate sexual rights as defined by Cairo and Beijing broadly 
into their work, or do not consider them important enough to be put high 
on their agendas alongside matters such as reproductive health. The 
question that follows is whether this is a subject on which the 
committees should develop their own doctrine, or whether the treaties 
lack sufficient definition of sexual rights such that the committees ought 
to give it the attention it needs by codifying standards. 
Even though the setting of a clear, well-defined standard may seem 
appealing at first sight, there are sufficient grounds on which to argue 
against codification of a right to sexual self-determination, at least at this 
 
 111. See Rishona Fleishman, Comment, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: The Impact 
of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14 EMORY 
INT’L REV. 277, 283-89 (2000). For a brief moment, it looked like the Vatican and a number of 
Islamic groups were willing to form an occasional alliance at the Cairo Conference to block an all 
too liberal take on abortion and same-sex relationships.  See The Vatican and Islamic Groups at 
Cairo, POPULATION NETWORK NEWS (Chantal Worzala ed., Human Development Dept. no. 9, Fall 
1994), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/hnp/hddflash/pnn/pnn9c.html. 
 112. See Nair et al., supra note 43. 
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point. Fried and Landsberg-Lewis, who discuss the possibilities of 
developing an agenda for sexual rights beyond the Cairo and Beijing 
conferences,113 affirm that it is important that sexual rights are 
acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of women’s human rights and 
human dignity, but they argue that it is important to “sustain the fluidity 
of the concept and its ability to include an ever-growing understanding 
of the range of experiences heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgendered women have as sexual beings and to expand the 
boundaries of what sexual rights mean, rather than limiting its 
application and meaning with over-definition.”114 A set definition – if 
one could even be drafted properly – would perhaps make it easier for an 
individual or human rights organization to make a claim about the 
violation of these rights, but at the same time, a fixed definition entails 
the risk of excluding certain situations and therefore resulting in an 
applicability that is more limited than would be desirable. 
The problem of exclusion by means of definition naturally does not 
apply to reproductive rights alone, but it might play a more significant 
role due to the special nature of sexual rights. As only limitedly 
surveyed in Part II, the issue of reproductive rights is interconnected 
with a great number of different rights, each of which entail a different 
type of State obligation, thereby making it more difficult to catch 
everything in one definition. As Fried and Landsberg-Lewis put it, the 
protection of sexual rights poses a strong challenge to the human rights 
framework, as it calls for the articulation of the “other side” of human 
rights, namely “the positive assertion of the full exercise and enjoyment 
of rights, including free expression of sexual identity.”115 In other words: 
sexual rights require action that would constitute a significant step 
beyond protection.116 
Another difficulty is fitting a theoretical definition of a right to 
sexual self-determination into the mold of purportedly neutral phrasing 
and equality-focused terminology as generally used in the human rights 
doctrine. Women need special protection when it comes to their 
reproductive rights, yet if such a right would be formulated in terms of 
equality, this implies equality to a male standard, which then excludes 
anything falling outside this model.117 Arguably, the focus should not be 
 
 113. Fried & Landsberg-Lewis, supra note 33, at 114-16 
 114. Id. at 114. 
 115. Id. at 116. 
 116. Miller, supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 117. Fried & Landsberg-Lewis, supra note 33, at 115. 
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on such formal equality, but rather on effective equality.118 The way to 
achieve such de facto equality certainly is not one and the same in all 
situations, and it would depend on the particular situation in each 
country what type of action is required. Starting with measures such as 
legal reform, one could think of education and other means of informing 
people and raising public awareness – not only in relation to, for 
example, the use of contraceptives and family planning, but also in order 
to challenge certain stereotypes or cultural practices existing within 
society that have a detrimental effect on women’s enjoyment of their 
sexual rights. Women’s organizations could play a significant role 
here.119 By incorporating women’s reproductive rights, including their 
right to sexual self-determination, into their agendas120 instead of 
treating it as a separate issue, eventually a more heightened awareness 
can be created which eventually could lead to the treaty bodies raising 
the issue more easily outside of the obvious context of health and family. 
With respect to how broad an issue on the agenda this should be, it 
is important that women’s organizations and human rights NGO’s take 
the lead in interpreting reproductive rights as broadly as possible.  It is 
perhaps a natural reflex to consider the right to enjoy one’s sexuality 
insignificant when faced with situations in which women are forced to 
marry a partner that is not of their choice at a young age, have no means 
to prevent or end an unwanted pregnancy even if it was the result of non-
consensual intercourse, or cannot find any legal redress when they are 
the victim of sexual violence within or outside of wedlock. Yet, that 
there are situations that are more egregious than not being able to be the 
sexual person one wants to be does not make the issue of sexual self-
determination less important. On this point I would like to quote Lynn 
Freedman, who argues that reproduction and sexuality have an intrinsic 
value as an essential element of human dignity: “Although control over 
reproduction and sexuality is certainly an essential precondition for 
women’s ability to exercise other rights and to fulfill other basic needs, 
it is also a worthy and valuable end in its own right, and not merely a 
means to reach other ends.”121 That there are other obstacles on the road 
to women’s full enjoyment of their right to sexual self-determination that 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 116-20. 
 120. Fried and Landsberg-Lewis name a number of examples in their article, but the list, which 
includes Amnesty International and a number of local organizations, is not extensive. Id. 
 121. Lynn P. Freedman, Censorship and Manipulation of Reproductive Health Information: An 
Issue of Human Rights and Women’s Health, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 5 (Sandra Coliver ed., University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1995). 
25
Jansen: Right to Freely Have Sex
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
JANSENFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  12:51:26 PM 
336 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:311 
need to be addressed does not mean that goal should not be kept in sight 
in its full form, repeatedly articulated and affirmed, and integrated in the 
human rights doctrine. 
A final significant roadblock for the committees taking a more 
progressive stance is a factor that has only been touched upon in this 
article, and that is the fact that a real right to sexual self-determination 
and independence – outside the confines of a family bond – besides the 
endorsement of ‘loose’ sexual behavior by women in general, 
automatically includes the possibility of same-sex relationships.  As 
Phillips voices the problem: 
 The concept of sexual rights brings to the center stage the tense 
relationship between claims to universality inherent in human rights 
and cultural relativism of expressions of intimacy, reproduction, 
gender relations, and identity that are so frequently central to national, 
religious, and moral discourses. . . . While . . . claims [to traditional 
culture or religious values] have been unequivocally rejected as a 
defense for other forms of discrimination, this does not appear to be so 
clearly the approach when it comes to issues of sexual orientation.122  
This complex issue cannot be done justice within the scope of this 
brief article, but it would certainly be worth asking the question why the 
committees have little trouble speaking out against other highly 
culturally determined practices such as arranged marriage or female 
genital cutting,123 yet show such restraint when it comes to sex.124 
CONCLUSION 
The three main treaty monitoring bodies have not yet 
acknowledged an all-encompassing right to sexual self-determination for 
women. They have affirmed, in various levels of decisiveness, the right 
to enjoy reproductive rights free from coercion or pressure and the 
freedom to decide if and when to reproduce.  The unlinking of sex from 
reproduction or the family concept, however, is a step the committees 
 
 122. Phillips, supra note 12, at 463. 
 123. U.N. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision (9th Sess., 1990), 
in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, at 211, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004); General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 
95, at paras. 11, 20, 24(l); General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 61, at para. 15(d); General 
Comment No. 28, supra note 62, at para. 11; General Comment No. 14, supra note 71, at para. 22. 
 124. On the shortcomings of CEDAW and the UDHR when it comes to the position of 
lesbians, see Nadine Gartner, Articulating Lesbian Human Rights: The Creation of a Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Lesbians, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 61 
(2005). 
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have yet to take. 
It is important that they do not go down the path the U.S. Supreme 
Court has taken, interpreting sex as a subset of what is apparently 
considered a more valuable type of inter-human relationship, and 
thereby casting a glooming shadow of Puritanism over what should be a 
positive aspect of people’s lives. Sex is an important part of who we are, 
and it is a part women should be equally capable of exploring as men. 
And if the treaty bodies have trouble talking about sex, civil society 
should continue addressing the subject within all relevant contexts until 
they do.  Hopefully, it will not take them too long to stop and listen. 
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